Introduction
The issues surrounding the potential for adverse trade impacts on food security and poverty have been a major area of contention in multilateral trade negotiations under the Doha Round. Concerns over rural poverty led to demands by India and China for enhanced safeguards for developing countries in agriculture, and in July 2008 the talks collapsed, once again, as negotiators failed to reach agreement on this issue. Given recent developments in the global economy, reaching a trade agreement is viewed by many as more vital than ever. Hence, it is important: (a) to evaluate the likely costs of a failure to reach an agreement as well as the costs/benefits of potential alternatives; and (b) to assess the potential effects not only on aggregate measures such economic welfare, but also on social measures such as income distribution, especially for the developing economies. This provides policymakers with information not only on the overall costs/benefits, but also on the areas where complementary policy interventions may be required.
The linkages between trade reform and poverty, and developing ways to quantitatively assess those linkages, have been the subject of intense recent research; consequently, there has been significant recent interest in using computable general equilibrium (CGE) methods for this purpose. Hertel and Reimer (2005) , and Hertel and Winters (2005) surveyed a number of recent CGE attempts to assess the poverty impact of trade liberalization, while studies applying specifically to countries in the Asia-Pacific region and in South Asia were surveyed by Gilbert (2008a) and Gilbert and Oladi (2010) , respectively.
Summarizing the findings of Gilbert and Oladi (2010) , there have been a number of country studies. Recent work by Pradhan and Sahoo (2006) , Gilbert (2007) , Panda and Ganesh-Kumar (2008) , and Polaski and others (2008) considered India. Gilbert (2007) looked at the impact of the current proposed modalities for reform in agriculture under Doha at the household level, in addition to more comprehensive agricultural reform, using the GTAP model to estimate the world market effects and a single economy CGE model of India. The results indicated that income inequality had improved. Pradhan and Sahoo (2006) used a similar CGE structure in their analysis of potential trade reform scenarios for India -although without a connection to a global CGE framework -and reached similar conclusions. Panda and Ganesh-Kumar (2008) specifically considered the issue of food security with changes in trade policy. Under a Doha scenario they found that all households experienced a rise in welfare, and a decline in poverty. Polaski and others (2008) considered the impact of price changes in agricultural commodities, and found that a decrease in the price of rice could have a significant negative impact on Indian poverty levels.
Results for Bangladesh were provided by Annabi and others (2006) and Raihan (2008) . Annabi and others (2006) used the GTAP model to estimate the overall effect of trade reform under the Doha proposals at the world level, and then inputted the world market effects into a single economy CGE model for Bangladesh, which was used to generate detailed results at the household level. The results indicated aggregate welfare losses for Bangladesh under the Doha scenarios, together with small increases in the headcount ratio. Raihan (2008) used a single economy model for Bangladesh, arguing, in contrast to most other studies, that the effects of unilateral reform in the aggregate were positive but small. Unfortunately, Raihan did not directly discuss poverty or income distribution impacts.
The most recent study on Sri Lanka, by Naranpanawa (2005) , considered a manufactured good trade liberalization scenario, and found that the potential benefits accruing to low income rural groups were low relative to other groups in the model, a fact attributed to a reduction in transfers following falls in government revenue. Ahmed and O'Donoghue (2008) used a model of Pakistan that was able to generate information on poverty, although they applied it to macroeconomic shocks rather than trade reform.
All these studies used single economy models, sometimes in combination with a global model such as GTAP or Linkage, to analyse the socio-economic impacts of policy changes on a single economy in the region. Since the Doha reforms are multilateral in nature, an approach that captures potential feedback effects across a region is preferable. This is particularly important in the case of South Asia, where economic relations with India are a dominant factor in the outcomes for other smaller economies. Hence, a model of the effects of Doha trade reforms on Sri Lanka in isolation, for example, may be seriously misleading if the indirect effects felt via Doha's impact on India are not taken into account.
Fewer studies have attempted to deal with household income distribution issues in the context of the whole region simultaneously, using a disaggregated CGE model. Khan (2008) presented very preliminary results for a prototype model for South Asia. The model is an interesting approach, incorporating several non-standard features, including technological dualism and rural-urban migration of the Harris-Todaro type. The model is calibrated to a single country (India) at present. Hence, the results are relevant to other countries in the region only by extension in the model's current form. Gilbert (2008b) , and Gilbert and Oladi (2010) differed in that they attempted to deal with household income distribution issues in the context of the whole region simultaneously, using a disaggregated CGE model. Both papers examined SAFTA rather than Doha trade reforms.
The study reported in this chapter used a CGE model of South Asia to analyse the economic impact of the Doha Round trade reform proposals on the economies of South Asia. For comparison, the implications of SAFTA were considered. The model was similar in structure to that used by Gilbert (2008b) . However, whereas that model used the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) Version 6 database with a base year of 2001, the present study used the GTAP7 database with a base year of 2004, as in Gilbert and Oladi (2010) .
Section A of this chapter shows how trade indices were used in the present study to evaluate the current trading environment in the region. Section B reviews the current Doha liberalization proposals while section C describes the structure of the model used, data sources and experimental design. Section D presents the preliminary results. The conclusion is provided in section E.
A. South Asian trade patterns
Before turning to the CGE analysis, it will be useful to review the current state of regional trade and protection in South Asia, which has been updated from that presented in Gilbert (2008b) . The regional trade shares (exports plus imports) are presented in table 1.
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The first set of numbers (South Asia as destination) show the percentage of South Asian economy exports that are directed to other economies in South Asia. The second set of numbers (South Asia as source) show the percentage of exports from South Asian economies that are directed to the individual economies of South Asia. For most economies within South Asia, the regional market is only a small proportion of their external trade, with only the smaller economies being (Sri Lanka and Bangladesh) relatively reliant on regional markets. Intraregional trade has grown in importance over the period for Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan, but has diminished for India. Overall, the intraregional trade share for South Asia has remained constant at between 3 per cent and 4 per cent, a low level compared to other regions.
Trade shares are not normalized by country size, and so may give a misleading picture of the relative importance of international trade flows (see Mikic and Gilbert, 2009 , for further discussion). The trade intensity index, defined as the ratio of the intraregional trade share to the share of the region in world trade, is able to provide an indication of the degree to which a particular trade linkage is stronger than might normally be expected, given the size of the economies in world trade. The index is presented in table 2. Values greater than unity indicate an "intense" trading relationship, while values of less than unity are interpreted as relatively weak. Normalized in this way, the trading relationships in the region appear somewhat stronger, reflecting geographical proximity.
It is also clear that the smaller economies in the region are heavily reliant on trade with the larger economies. It is also noted that the overall intensity of trade within South Asia has been declining, driven largely by India, which now trades with other countries in South Asia only about as much as a "typical" country in world trade.
In this section all the calculations are based on COMTRADE data for [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . The calculations are based on reporter data; however, where that information is missing the relevant flows have been reconstructed using the mirror data from partners.
Next, consider the trade complementarity and export similarity profiles in tables 3, 4 and 5. Constructed in much the same way as the complementarity index, export similarity is a measure of the degree of overlap between two competing economies. An index of 100 indicates that the two groups share identical export profiles, while an index of 0 indicates that the two groups compete in entirely separate markets. The calculations compare each country with South Asia as a whole. Nonetheless, for Sri Lanka and Pakistan, the similarity indices remain high. In other words, the countries of South Asia tend to have a revealed comparative advantage in similar products. The values of the index have been declining over time, however. In conjunction with the increase in complementarity, this does suggest production shifts gradually aligning in these economies. The pairwise matrix (table 6) reveals that Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have the most similar export profiles.
Finally, table 7 describes the state of protection in the region, using the bilateral applied tariff (trade weighted). Substantial progress has been made in lowering the average level of protection in the South Asian economies during the past decade, but applied tariffs remain moderately high on average, with a tendency towards high agricultural protection, especially in India. In many cases, there is also a substantial degree of binding overhang, especially in Bangladesh, but also in India and Sri Lanka. Overall, the protection levels in the South Asia suggest that there is potential for efficiency gains from trade reform in general.
Taken together, the trade flow and protection patterns suggest a region that has been gradually becoming more interdependent, but where India plays a clearly dominant role. This strongly suggests that, as alluded to in the introduction, when considering the effect of trade reform scenarios for countries within the region, it is important to take into account the other economies, and in particular the linkages to India. 
B. Proposed trade reforms under Doha
To evaluate what types of trade reforms would likely be required in the region under Doha, the modalities contained in the special session of the Committees on Agriculture and NAMA, 17 July 2007, were examined. These set out formulae for cuts in the areas of domestic support, market access (tariffs) and export competition in addition to treatments of sensitive products, safeguards and related issues.
3 While these are, of course, subject to further change, they provide a useful guideline to possible outcomes. In this section, the main features of the proposals are set out. A more detailed summary can be found in Gilbert (2008a) .
Broadly, the proposals cover agricultural and non-agricultural tariffs, and domestic agricultural support. In terms of agricultural market access, the proposals require that members reduce bound duties following a tiered formula of 48 per cent-73 per cent for developed countries, depending on the initial bound levels, with commitments for developing economies -which include all of the economies of South Asia examined in the present study except Bangladesh -having slightly higher bands and lower required reductions (two-thirds of developed economy levels). There are a number of exemptions. In particular, least developed members, such as Bangladesh, and very recently acceded members are not required to undertake any reductions beyond those already committed, while "small and vulnerable" economies are entitled to moderate the required cuts by a further 10 percentage points. Moreover, developed economies may designate 4 per cent to 6 per cent of dutiable lines as sensitive, with developing economies entitled to levels of 5 per cent to 8 per cent. These require reductions at two-thirds of the rate required under the tiered formula. However, under the proposal, developed country members would commit to duty and quota-free market access for all products originating in LDCs.
On the non-agricultural market access (NAMA) side, the basic proposed cut is a Swiss formula with a coefficient of 8-9 for developed economies and 19-23 for developing economies, applied to bound rates. The proposal also extends binding coverage, with unbound tariffs to be bound at 2001 MFN applied rates plus 20 per cent. Once again, there are several exemptions. Developing economies may choose not to apply the formula to up to 10 per cent of NAMA imports, provided the cuts are at least half the formula, or they may choose not to apply the formula at all to up to 5 per cent of NAMA imports. Countries with low binding coverage may choose not to make reductions, provided that they instead commit to binding 90 per cent of tariff lines at a level not exceeding 29 per cent. The LDCs are not required to make any cuts, but are expected to increase their binding commitments.
Finally, proposed agricultural domestic support reductions are in the range of 45 per cent to 70 per cent, in accordance with a tiered formula. Developed countries with a level of total AMS of at least 40 per cent of the total value of agricultural production will make a further 10 per cent reduction if their total AMS is in the second tier and 5 per cent if they are in the third tier. Once again, developing economy member reductions are two thirds of those of developed economies, while small, low-income recently acceded members are not required to undertake a reduction in total AMS. The de minimis levels are cut by 50 per cent from those set out under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. For agricultural export competition, the commitment is elimination of export subsidies by 2013 for developed economies, and an as yet unspecified reduction by developing economies.
C. Methodology
In analysing the effect of these proposals on the economies of South Asia, a custombuilt CGE model of the region was used, with sub-economy models for key countries, programmed using the GAMS system. This section outlines the key characteristics of the model structure and experimental design. The model covers Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka as well as an aggregate "rest of South Asia" (RSA) and an incompletely modelled "rest of world" (ROW) region. The structure of the model was discussed previously in Gilbert (2008b) and Gilbert and Oladi (2010) , who provided a somewhat more detailed description, and it is similar in many respects to GTAP and other global models. Hence, the description here is kept brief.
The model identifies 16 production sectors. Each produces a joint product for domestic and foreign markets. The production functions use intermediate goods in fixed proportions and all primary factors in variable proportions. Intermediate inputs are composites of imported goods and domestic production, with proportions that are variable and specified independently by industry, i.e., an Armington structure with aggregating functions varying by end-use.
Competitive conditions hold, so firms pay market prices for all inputs, and make zero economic profits. Primary endowments are fixed, and in the default closure all factors except natural resources are treated as mobile across economic activities.
Several consumption activities are identified, that is, the government, investment and multiple consumer households. The number of consumer households varies by region. Final consumption of each household is modelled using Stone-Geary utility functions, the parameters of the functions varying by household to capture differences in consumption patterns. The quantity of government consumption and investment is held constant in the default closure. All agents consume composites of imported goods and domestic production, with proportions that are variable and specified independently by agent. On the income side, factors are owned in varying proportions by the households, and fixed proportions are maintained in household savings, taxation and government transfers.
The exportable production by domestic firms is allocated over destination regions using a second level transformation function; hence, the aggregate exportable is a composite of exports to the various regions. Similarly, on the import side, the imports of each country are a composite of regional imports (i.e., a second-level Armington function). Unlike at the first level, this function is common across all agents in the domestic economy. Demand for regional exports is derived from the Armington import structure for all regions that are explicitly modelled. For regions that are not explicitly modelled (here, the ROW region), the computational complexity of the model is reduced by implementing only a demand function. The prices of imports from the ROW region are fixed.
An international transportation sector accounts for the difference between the FOB price of exports and the CIF price of imports. Transportation margins vary by commodity along all international routes. Unlike in the GTAP model, because of the focus here on a single relatively small region, the price of international transportation services is fixed.
The price normalization and macro closure rules are similar to those used in many single country models. The current account balance is fixed and the nominal exchange rate is allowed to vary to maintain balance within each country. The numeraire in each country is the consumer price index. We must also define a numeraire region for which the nominal exchange rate is fixed, which in this model is the ROW region. The model includes a full range of distortions in the form of taxes and subsidies on economic activities at all levels to ensure that the second-best implications of the policy scenarios are adequately accounted for.
The base data on trade, production, aggregate consumption and employment is extracted from the GTAP7 database. Information on sources of household income (ownership of primary factors and transfers/taxes) and variation in consumption patterns across households have been obtained from Pradhan and Sahoo (2006) for India, Fontana and Wobst (2001) for Bangladesh, Naranpanawa (2005) for Sri Lanka, and Roland-Holst (2008) for Pakistan. The household categories used in the model are listed in table 8. The information in each study was aggregated/disaggregated and rebalanced where necessary to match the dimensions of the model and to be consistent with the aggregate GTAP7 household consumption data. The exact process is described in Gilbert and Oladi (2010) .
Model elasticity parameters are obtained from the existing estimates in GTAP7. Armington elasticities have recently been estimated by Hertel and others (2007) . Base substitution elasticities in production are also obtained from GTAP7.
In terms of experimental design, shocks to tariffs were chosen to mimic as closely as possible the liberalization that would occur in South Asia under the NAMA and agricultural Doha proposals. The results of the complete proposal are presented. Since this is a regional model, the simulations represent the impact of the South Asian trade reforms ceteris paribus, i.e., they do not capture the effect of liberalization in countries outside the region, which would be felt through the terms of trade. Hence, the results should not be interpreted as the full effect of Doha on these economies, but rather the implications for the region of the required tariff cuts under Doha, ceteris paribus. As a benchmark, a regional scenario representing SAFTA was also considered, involving only the removal of internal tariffs in the region. Sources: Pradhan and Sahoo, 2006; Fontana and Wobst, 2001; Naranpanawa, 2005; and RolandHolst, 2008. year had the proposed changes been implemented and the economic system given sufficient time to adjust to the new equilibrium. A sensitivity analysis was implemented within the simulations by using an unconditional approach adopted in Gilbert and Wahl (2003) . This approach improves the policy value of the simulations by highlighting results that are unlikely to be robust, and by providing an estimate of the range of potential outcomes rather than a point estimate.
To undertake the analysis, key parameters (the trade elasticities) are treated as normally and independently distributed random variables. Each simulation is run as a Monte-Carlo experiment, with a series of pseudo-random parameter values chosen from the underlying distributions. With a large number of iterations (1,000 were used in the present study) of the simulation, the mean predictions of the variables of interest can be approximated, together with indicators of their susceptibility to parametric uncertainty (the standard deviations), and the accuracy of the simulation procedure (the standard errors). Again, for further details see Gilbert and Oladi (2010) .
D. Preliminary results
The preliminary results of the analysis are presented in table 9, which covers economic welfare effects by household and country, and table 10, which presents information on production shifts. First consider the impact of the trade reforms on overall economic welfare. The results of the simulations, using the household equivalent variation (EV) measure, are presented in the third row from the bottom of table 8, labelled "total". This type of estimate of the benefit/cost of the proposed change is sometimes called a "one off" gain/loss. However, the changes are permanent, so this can be considered (more or less) as a permanent increment to household incomes at constant prices. A true "one off" measure of the benefit/cost is the discounted permanent income stream. Clearly, this will depend heavily on the discount rate applied. If the discount rate is assumed to be a standard 2 per cent, the total estimated benefit is 50 times the annual increment (the figures in the row labelled "cumulative"). This can be considered as the total benefit of the reduction in trade barriers.
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However measured, in absolute terms, the biggest beneficiary under the Doha scenario among the South Asian economies is "rest of South Asia" (RSA), followed by Sri Lanka. Other economies are worse off under the scenarios, with both Bangladesh and India suffering losses of about the same magnitude (very small), and Pakistan doing slightly worse. By contrast, the projected benefits of SAFTA are larger, and positive for all economies except Bangladesh. India is the biggest winner, followed closely by RSA. These results are consistent with those in Gilbert (2008b) , and all appear robust to underlying parameter uncertainty.
In terms of relative benefits, the estimated welfare impact relative to a baseline metric can be evaluated, the initial GDP. The final row of table 9 expresses the cumulative gain as a proportion of GDP. Viewed from this perspective, by far the biggest beneficiary of trade reforms under both Doha and SAFTA is RSA, by a substantial margin. RSA is followed by Sri Lanka, with the gains to India from SAFTA being quite small when expressed as a percentage of GDP. The large gains to RSA reflect significant improvements in market access to its dominant trading partner, India.
Initially, it appears that the simulation results support (at least in terms of overall efficiency) a regional trade reform process through SAFTA over a multilateral process 5 For a variety of reasons, this estimate is likely to be very much a lower bound, since the comparative static simulation technique used here does not capture any potential dynamic accumulation effects (i.e., some proportion of the increment to income may be invested, leading to a multiplier effect), and the competitive model used does not account for potential scale effects. See Francois and Martin, 2010 , for an in-depth discussion of these issues.
through Doha, although as might be expected given the similarity of the export profiles (as discussed above) the gains from SAFTA are also modest. However, as noted above, a little care is needed with interpretation of the simulation results. This model is computing the effect of only the reform taking place within South Asia. With Doha, reforms would be taking place in other countries also, and the effect of these reforms should be reflected in the terms of trade. In other words, the potential market access benefits of Doha outside of South Asia are not being captured. Of course, for the most part, these terms of trade effects are exogenous, so the isolated within-South Asia effects are analytically relevant; however, it is necessary to make sure that the numbers are interpreted in context. They do not provide support for regional approaches over multilateral.
Before turning to the estimated impact on household welfare, it is useful to review the household categories in the model, as presented in table 8. As detailed in Gilbert and Oladi (2010) , in the Sri Lankan data there are five household groups, broken down by location and income.
The data for India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are grouped by archetype. In India, group H2 (rural agricultural labour) is the poorest, by a substantial margin, followed by H4 (other rural) and H3 (rural non-agricultural labour). The richest groups are H6 (urban self-employed) and H7 (urban salaried). The households differ substantially in their ownership of productive factors, with the richest rural group (H1, rural self-employed) being major owners of land and capital, while the poorer households, especially H2, receive income almost exclusively from selling unskilled labour. In comparing the poorest two groups (H2 and H4) with the richest two (H6 and H7), significant differences can also be seen in spending patterns. In particular, the two poorest groups spend nearly 2.5 times more of their income on basic food items (especially processed rice) than do the two richest groups.
In Bangladesh, the poorest groups are H1 and H2, rural groups with only limited or no land holdings. They are followed by H7, H3 and, to a lesser extent, H8, the urban illiterate and poorly educated, and rural households with small land holdings. The richest groups are urban households with high or medium education (H9 and H10). The factor allocation pattern is similar to India, with the lower income groups having a much higher dependence on unskilled labour. Consumption differences are also similar, with the poorest households devoting more than double the proportion of their budget to processed rice compared with the richest households.
In the case of Pakistan, the data show a combined archetype and income level classification. The data are very detailed, with a concentration on rural households. Households are grouped into multiple farm sizes based on land holdings, and three regions, in addition to the rural rich and urban poor/rich. In total, the model tracks changes in the behaviour of 44 household groups in the region.
The decomposition of the total welfare impacts on the various household groups is given in table 9. The boxed figures are not robust to changes in the underlying parameters of the model. Other values are robust given the assumptions for the parameter distributions.
For Pakistan, in both scenarios all households except one are estimated to gain (with a couple not robust). The losing households are those of the urban rich. Although the overall impact of the Doha scenario is negative (positive for SAFTA), the policy is likely to be pro-poor. For Bangladesh, again the groups that are hurt by trade reform are the urban rich (H9 and H10). These results are interesting, given the debate about Doha, which has focused on negative impacts on the rural poor. At least for these economies, the policies do not hurt the rural poor as feared, but rather the urban rich. Of course, from a political economy perspective, this could be highly problematic.
In India also, there is a highly skewed income distribution effect, with group H1 being a serious loser from trade reform under either scenario (although the result is not robust under the SAFTA scenario). The H1 group represents rural landowners. On the whole, this group is not really poor, so the policies are again not hurting the rural poor (groups H2, H3 and H4), but rather the rural rich. Again, this might have significant political economy implications.
The only result that is consistent with the conventional wisdom is for Sri Lanka, where the model projects a reduction in household incomes only for group H2, the rural poor. All other households gain. The loss in incomes for the rural poor is most marked under the Doha scenario, and in fact is not robust in the SAFTA scenario. Nonetheless, this result gives cause for concern, as it suggests that the impact of trade reform in Sri Lanka may hit the poorest groups in society relatively hard. Since the overall gains are positive, redistribution would make it feasible to make all groups better off, in principle.
Overall then, the impacts of the changes at the household level exhibit more variation than the aggregate results. While the trade policy scenarios considered here appear to be pro-poor in an absolute sense in many cases, there is little doubt that some household groups would be hard hit by trade liberalization, especially under the Doha proposals. In most cases, it is the relatively advantaged groups that are hurt by reforms, generally not the rural poor. Although the calculations are based on assumption of invariant transfers, taxes and factor ownership, in principle these can be changed if the political will exists.
In addition to overall welfare effects and their distribution across various groups in the societies in question, CGE simulation also generates sectoral information. Of particular interest are changes in the production structure, because (a) they indicate which sectors are most likely to feel the impact of the proposed policy, and (b) they provide an indication of the potential degree of structural adjustment required. Estimates of the sectoral production changes are presented in table 10. Again, results that are not considered robust under the sensitivity analysis are highlighted with a box.
Overall, the biggest adjustments are expected in RSA, under both scenarios, with large expansions in chemicals and metal production, smaller expansions in textiles, and declines in agriculture textiles and heavy manufactures. Under the SAFTA scenario the pattern is similar in Sri Lanka, while the production shifts in India are all very small, suggesting little adjustment difficulty. Under the Doha trade reforms the adjustment required in India would be more substantial, with large increases in production of apparel and manufactures, and declines in food production.
E. Conclusion
In this chapter, the author has used descriptive statistics and CGE methods to assess the potential impact of trade reforms required under the Doha Development Agenda on the economies of South Asia, and compared the results with a potential regional trade agreement (SAFTA). The model differs from others in the literature in that it isolates household-level impacts for a diverse range of household groups across the region. The research is part of an ongoing analysis further detailed in Gilbert (2008b) , and Gilbert and Oladi (2010) .
The preliminary results suggest that, in contrast to the current perception, the distributional impacts of the trade reforms required under the current Doha proposals are not likely to be biased against the rural poor in many of the economies. In contrast, in most of the economies the bias is against the urban non-poor. These simulations do not capture the effect of market access under Doha, so of course they do not reflect the full impact of a potential Doha agreement. Hence, the arguments that the Doha trade reforms would have an adverse impact on the rural poor, to the extent that they are based on market access (i.e., terms of trade) effects, are not necessarily inconsistent with these results. However, it is noted that the talks collapsed largely over the issue of safeguards, a domestic liberalization issue. Moreover, the results in this chapter reflect the component of the Doha reform agenda that is under the direct control of the economies of South Asia, and so provide some interesting insights.
Future work will concentrate on improving the shock estimates in the model and incorporating the market access effects.
